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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN V. BENSON and EMILY SUE 
BENSON, 
Defendants, 
and 
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT & LOAN 
CO., a corporation, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGE P. RUFF, 
Third-Party 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
GEORGE P. RUFF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from that portion of the Judgment and Order 
of Dismissal entered by the Trial Court on April 22, 1976, wherein 
the Court dismissed with prejudice Counts II and III of the Third-
Party Complaint and appeals from an Order of the Trial Court 
denying Appellant's Motion to Amend Judgment and Motion for Relief 
from Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A final Order, dismissing with prejudice, the third-party 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 14684 
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« 
Plaintiff-Appellant1s complaint against the third-party defendant-
respondent was entered by the Court on March 9, 1976 after the 
jury had been impaneledf and the trial had begun, as a conse-
quence of a settlement during trial reached between the 
plaintiff and defendant during the noon recess and after the 
plaintiff as third-party plaintiff had advised the Court it was 
I 
not prepared to proceed to trial against the third-party defen-
dant. Thereafter, on May 5, 1976, third-party plaintiff-
appellant filed a Motion to Amend Judgment and a Motion for 
Relief from Judgment* Following the hearing on the said 
Motion to Amend Judgment and for Relief from Judgment, the 
lower court denied third-party plaintiff-appellant's motions, 
i 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Trial Courtfs final Order 
of Dismissal with prejudice, and the Trial Court's ruling in 
denying Appellant's Motion to Amend Judgment and Motion for 
Relief From Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Murray First Thrift, (hereinafter MFT) filed 
a Complaint against John V. and Emily Sue Benson (hereinafter 
Bensons), on November 15, 1974, in the District Court of ^ 
Washington County, State of Utah. (R 1. ) The Complaint was based 
upon a series of loan transactions between MFT and Bensons. 
On January 20, 1975, Bensons filed an Answer and Counterclaim ^ 
(R 125-135) and on February 10, 1975, Bensons filed an Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim. ( R 136-138). Thereafter, extensive Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discovery was undertaken by both sides. Finally, on October 
10, 1975, just three and one-half months prior to the original 
date set for trial, and 11 months after the case had been original] 
filed, MFT filed a third-party Complaint against George Ruff 
an individual, as third-party defendant. (R 139-156), 
The third-party defendant-respondent, George Ruff, had 
worked for MFT in various positions but was fired by MFT in 
February 1974. March 9, 197 6 Proceedingsf p. 28. At the 
time of trial, George Ruff was working as an employee for his 
church, March 9, 1976, Proceedings, p. 22. 
Appellant's Third-Party Complaint against George Ruff, 
respondent, sought recovery from George Ruff of 1) any funds 
MFT may have to pay Bensons on the Counterclaim by Bensons as 
a result of alleged actions by George Ruff, 2) any funds MFT 
may be unable to collect from Bensons due to George Ruff's 
failure to fulfill and discharge his duties, and 3) conversion 
of more than $10,000.00. (R 139-145.) Because of MFT's "11th 
hour" efforts to involve George Ruff as a third-party defendant, 
and with the trial date already set when the third-party complaint 
was filed,third-party defendant, Ruff, (hereinafter respondent) 
was forced to do a great and burdensome amount of discovery 
in a short period of time in order to prove he did not convert 
MFT funds to his own use and that all of his actions and conduct 
of business were consistent with business practices of appellant 
MFT. Discovery on respondent's part was extremely complex and 
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costly as a great deal of accounting work had to be done with 
records of the appellant, in addition to collecting and evaluating 
numerous documents in the possession of MFT. March 9, 1976, Pro-
ceedings , p. 11r 33. 
At the beginning of the trial with the jury impaneled, an 
opening statement by each party to the action was made, whereupon 
the court ordered a noon recess. Upon returning to the courtroom, 
respondent learned that during the recess plaintiff-MFT and 
defendants-Benson had compromised and settled their claims 
against one another. (R 30-33). Only after all parties were 
in St. George, Utah, and were in trial of the case did MFT and 
Bensons discuss settlement. 
According to the stipulation read into the record, defendants-
Benson agreed to transfer to plaintiff-MFT the apartment complex 
which respondent, as employee of MFT, had taken as security for 
the various MFT loans to Benson, whereupon the court ordered 
dismissal of MFT's Amended Complaint and Benson's Counterclaim. 
March 9, 1976 Proceedings, p. 31-35. MFT as third-party 
plaintiff stated to the Court that Count One of the Third Party 
Complaint against third party defendant-respondent Ruff was 
now moot, and then requested that Counts Two and Three be 
dismissed without prejudice stating that MFT will not know ..." 
until we have liquidated the Benson property whether, and to 
what extent Murray has been injured ... by Mr. Ruff." March 9, 
1976, Proceedings, p. 33. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
At this point, counsel for respondent demanded his day in 
court* The following dialogue took place: 
MR. CASSITY (for Respondent-third party defendant -
Ruff): Your Honor, I have almost unbelievable expense because 
of the complications, that detail, which the Court hasn't 
been subject to, unfortunately, as of this moment. 
The third-party defendant, George Ruff, is prepared 
to try this case, has spent a considerable amount 
of money subpoenaing witnesses out of Salt Lake City, 
as well as other areas, and is here prepared to 
proceed relative to all claims in these proceedings 
against this defendant and we are here and we intend 
to go forward and any settlement notwithstanding these 
parties we are going to pursue until this matter is either 
disposed of by judgment or verdict in this case or by 
<# 
dismissal with prejudice as to all claims against this 
defendant, 
THE COURT: There is no objection to the dismissal; 
on the other hand, you claim it should be with prejudice 
and not without prejudice? 
MR. CASSITY: I have no objection to any other provision 
except in regard to Count 2 and Count 3, as stated by Mr. 
Ferrari, where he moves that they be dismissed without 
prejudice. I insist on my day in Court and it is here. 
THE COURT: And you are ready to go? 
-5-
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i 
MR. CASSITY: I am, sir. 
THE COURT: All right, I will hear you, Mr. Ferrari. 
MR. FERRARI: Well, you Honor, Count 2 and 3 are 
counts, claims for damages resulting from Mr. — from 
Mr. Ruff's wrongful acts in connection with the 
Benson trust actions. We have now through this settlement ^ 
obtained, or will obtain, title to real property of 
indeterminate value. It is quite possible that the 
liquidation of this property will leave us without damages, ^ 
therefore, to go forward with a claim against Mr. Ruff 
at this time — 
THE COURT: You can't go forward now is what you are j 
saying? 
MR. FERRARI: That is correct. 
March 9, 1976 Proceedings, p. 33-34. • 0 
Thus, after 16 months of preparation, arrival of trial date 
in St. George, Utah, impaneling of a jury, opening statements 
at trial having been made, and "literally minutes before evidence 0 
would have been presented to the jury",, (Appellant's Brief, p. 4) 
appellant was unwilling to go forward as stated by their own counsel. 
No reason was given by appellant counsel why the issue of liability • 
on the second count and the third count could not have been 
tried and decided at that time, but for refusal of appellant 
to proceed. • 
Following the order of the court dismissing the Third-
Party Complaint with prejudice, the Court said, " ... the Court Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inquired as to your ability to go forward. This is the time set 
for trial. You indicated you could not. That's the ruling of the 
Court, prepare appropriate pleadings." March 9, 1976 Proceedings, 
p. 35. Thus, because of appellant's failure and refusal to go 
forward at the time of trial, the Judge dismissed the Third-Party 
Complaint with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 
The dismissal with prejudice by the lower court was 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(a)(2) which 
provides in part that "an action shall,not be dismissed at the 
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." The 
vast majority of the Federal Courts interpreting the Federal 
equivalent of this rule have held that the trial court is granted 
broad discretion to grant or deny a 41(a)(2) motion 
and to impose such conditions as it deems just. 
For example, the court in Butler v. Denton, 150 F.2d 687 
(10th Cir. 194 5) held; 
Under the Rule, the court is vested with a reasonable 
discretion in the matter of dismissal after the filing 
and service of the answer... And the action of the court 
in respect of dismissal will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless the discretion has been abused. 150 F.2dr»at 690. 
(Emphasis added) « ~ 
The New Mexico Supreme Court, interpreting an identical 
statute, was of the opinion that the decision of the lower 
court with respect to voluntary dismissal, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Is a matter of Judicial discretion, the exercise of 
which will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence 
of clear abuse. (Emphasis added) Emmco Insurance Company 
v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525, 260 P.2d 712, (1953). 
The record shows the following aspects of the case upon 
which the ruling of the court can be justified: 
1. Advanced stage of proceedings. The farther along in 
proceedings that the plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal 
is made, the more obligated the court is to deny it. In Paturzo 
v. Home Life Ins. Co., 503 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1974), the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals summed up its position as follows: 
Furthermore, we found that the denial of a plaintiff's 
motion voluntarily to dismiss would not have been an 
abuse of discretion, ,fIn view of the advanced stage of the 
proceedings." Citing Armstrong v. Frostie Company, 453 F. 
2d 914 (4th Cir. 1971) at 916. Likewise, in Young v. 
John McShain, Inc., 130 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1942), we 
indicated our hesitancy in granting a voluntary dismissal 
where the action has progressed to or beyond the trial 
stage. Id. at 335 (Emphasis added) 
In Shaffer v. Evans, 263 F.2d 135 (10th Cir. 1958), 
a District Court had dismissed the plaintiff's case with prejudice 
when the plaintiff declined to go forward after its motion for 
dismissal without prejudice was denied. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the lower court's ruling stating: 
This action has been pending for some six months at the 
time of the hearing of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. 
Depositions had been taken, the defendant had made arrange-
ments for medical testimony, a pre-trial conference 
had been held. The case had not been set down for trial 
but apparently was ready for trial at the next jury term. 
Requiring the plaintiff to proceed under those circumstances 
in the court in which he had filed his action could hardly 
be termed arbitrary. Certainly, no reason prejudicial 
to his substantive rights was suggested for dismissal, 
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The motion for voluntary dismissal made by MFT was not 
made until the jury had been impaneled and the opening statements 
had been made by the respective counsel for MFT - plaintiff-appellan 
defendants and third-party defendant-respondent. 
2. Hardship as a result of expense and delay. Courts in 
deciding a 41 (a) (2) motion may consider the expense invested 
by the defendant in preparation for trial. In Cincinnati Traction 
Building Company, v. Pullman Standard Car Manufacturer Company, 
25 F. Supp. 332, (D. Del. 1938), the Delaware District Court held 
that where depositions have been taken and where 
Plaintiff has chosen the forum and has required defendant 
to answer and prepare its defense at great expense,... 
[the] defendant is entitled to have the controversy finally 
adjudicated so that it may definitely know its rights. 
Another district court in Roth v. Great Atlantic and Pacific 
Tea Company, 5 FRServ. 41 a.22 case 3 (S.D. Ohio 1942) 
reasoned as follows: 
The defendant, by its counsel, has made affidavit that it 
has expended the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) 
in its defense of this suit. Under such circumstances 
the court would abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's 
motion for dismissal and relegating the defendant a few 
dollars by way of cost. (Emphasis added) 
The instant case, as alluded to by all parties in their 
opening statements, involves a very complex set of facts including 
a great deal of accounting minutia, the preparation of which 
led to what counsel for the third party defendant-respondent 
referred to as "almost unbelievable expense." Furthermore, MFT, 
by choosing a distant forum (St. George, Utah) imposed much add-
itional expense on the defendant ( a resident of Salt Lake City). 
-9-
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Courts may also consider the potential hardship resulting 
from a delay in resolving the issue presented by a case. A 
Federal District Court in California in Golconda Petroleum 
Corporation v. Petrol Corporation, 46 F. Supp. 23, (S.D. 
Cal. 194 2) argued that the granting of plaintiff's voluntary 
motion for dismissal 
Would result in an action being commenced in the State 
Courts with considerable delay in deciding the issues. 
This would create a hardship and courts are jealous 
of avoiding such a result. (Citing cases) (Emphasis added) 
Appellant in its third-party complaint alleged wrong doing by | 
respondent including conversion in excess of $10/000.00. Defendant 
was prepared at the time of trial to go forward, to meet the 
allegations and to prove them to be false. f 
It would have been distinctly detrimental to respondent 
to delay the opportunity to prove himself innocent of the serious 
charges made by MFT. f 
The Washington County District Judge was also aware that 
the sums involved were comparatively large, that the respondent 
was a former loan officer at MFT who had lost his job and who • 
was at the time of the trial, working for his church. To allow 
a possible judgment for potentially large sums of money to 
hang over the respondent's head undecided for an indefinite ' 
period of time would work a significant hardship where the 
respondent necessarily was already prepared, present in court, 
and able to litigate the issues at a trial which had already begun. * 
The burden of uncertainty which granting of appellant's Motion 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would have placed upon respondent defendant was itself sufficient 
reason for exercise of discretion by the court below. 
3, Appellant declined to go forward. The trial transcript 
at page 34, line 24 reveals the following dialogue: 
COURT: You canf t go forward now is what you are 
saying? 
MR* FERRARI: That is correct. 
The Court after announcing that the case was dismissed 
with prejudice stated its reason as follows: 
... on the other hand the court inquired as to your 
ability to go forward. This is the time set for trial. 
You indicated you could not. That's the ruling of the 
court, prepare appropriate pleadings. March 9, 1976, 
Proceedings,p. 35, beginning at line 18. ( Emphasis 
added) 
In Shafer v. Evans, supra., the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the dismissal with prejudice by a district court 
where the plaintiff had "declined to proceed" after his motion 
for voluntary dismissal was denied. 
In the instant case where grounds were apparent for the 
denial of appellant's motion for voluntary dismissal and where 
the appellant had manifested its unwillingness to proceed 
on the merits, dismissal with prejudice was completely appropriate, 
4, The court's ruling was one of several reasonable 
alternatives and the appellant failed to provide the court 
with its now suggested alternative. The appellant alleges 
that the lower court abused its discretion by not choosing 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
to grant the appellant's motion for dismissal without prejudice 
subject to the conditions that appellant would pay any additional 
costs incurred by the respondent in an additional trial. This 
proposal made by the appellant is one of a number of 
alternatives which the court could have chosen. Assuming 
arguendo that the alternative suggested by the appellant 
was the best alternative, it is still not an abuse of discre-
tion for a court to fail to opt for the best of all possible 
alternative courses of action. To hold otherwise would be
 a 
i 
holding that a court has no discretion in the matter at all. 
The case of Alamance Industries Incorporated v. Filene's 
291 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1961) is cited by Third Party plaintiff-
appellant for the proposition that courts when ruling on a 41(a)(2) 
motion should "impose curative conditions." In that case the 
plaintiff had suggested to the trial court the conditions 
upon which it should have dismissed the action. Respondent 
points out that the "curative conditions" upon which the Court 
of Appeals held that case should have been dismissed, were in 
the circuit court's opinion equivalent to dismissal with prejudice. 
(291 F.2d 145). 
5. Appellant's suggested reason for inability to go forward -
on the merits was not sufficiently compelling. Appellant suggests to 
this court that it could not go forward on the merits because 
it was not yet certain of its damage. The damage issue was g 
-12-
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only a fraction of the issues placed before the court by the 
litigation between third party plaintiff-appellant md third 
party defendant-respondent. Appellant was claiming in its 
third party complaint that respondent had converted more than 
$10,000.00 of its funds to his own use. This claim was 
in no way affected by the settlement between plaintiff and 
defendants. Also, the most difficult and complex issue of appellant 
damage claim was that of liability. Appellant gave the trial 
Judge no reason whatsoever for not proceeding on these issues. 
In addition, in almost any lawsuit, damages are not 
liquidated in advance of trial to the exact penny. Nevertheless, 
a plaintiff is usually required to show damages as best he can 
at the time of trial. For example, in a personal injury action 
the exact amount of damage cannot be determined until the plain-
tiff's death brings an end to medical bills, lost wages, and pain. 
It would be absurd to contend that because of this uncertainty 
the claim in a personal injury case could not be litigated until 
the plaintiff dies. 
Further, appellant's ability to show its damage was not inhibit 
by its settlement with the defendants-Benson, but was rather 
improved by a significant narrowing of the issues involved. 
Appellant could not have known what its actual and exact damages 
were when it first brought its claim against the third-party 
defendant-respondent. Its actual damages could not be determined 
until the court decided liability and recovery as between 
MFT and the Bensons, judgment was entered, and the judgment was 
- i ^ -
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collected or written off as uncollectible. There was no < 
guarantee that the Bensons were sufficiently solvent to cover 
any judgment which may have been had against them, and an evaluation 
of the Benson's ability to pay a judgment entered against them i 
would necessarily have involved the valuation and/or liquidation 
of their primary asset, the apartment complex which appellant 
accepted in settlement. Thus, appellant, absent the settlement, I 
would have had to proceed through the entire trial and collection 
proceedings before it would have any hope of showing exactly what 
damage, if any, it had suffered as a result of the third party ^ 
defendant-respondent's "alleged" wrong doing. 
Appellant did not choose to wait until its damage was exactly 
defined before it brought its claim against the respondent. •'• * 
Rather, it chose to involve the respondent in the litigation 
of this issue, thus forcing the respondent to defend against 
said claim and to face the same uncertainties as the appellant. 
Respondent, at trial, was prepared to litigate all issues 
raised by the third party plaintiff-appellant the day of the 
trial. Appellant's whining after the beginning of the trial, that 
it could not proceed on the merits because it could not 
determine with certainty what its actual damages were, 
4 
was inconsistent with the initiation of its claim against respon-
dent in the first place. Therefore, appellant's argument 
was not sufficiently compelling to be given significant weight 
4 
by the trial court. For the Court to have considered appellant's 
-14-
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explanation otherwise, would fly in the face of the notions 
of justice and fair play. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the great expense respondent had incurred to prepare 
for trial; the stage of trial proceedings at which time the 
motion of appellant was made; the burden of uncertainty that 
the respondent would have to bear, if the court ruled for 
the appellant; and given the fact that appellant stated its 
inability to proceed; the lower court's dismissal with pre-
judice was within the permissible bounds of discretion and 
should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED., 
/Y / ,-' / 
SI 
C 7 ,^.-- ^ J<=r 
DONN E. CASSITY 
JON M. JEPPSON 
ROMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Resporcdenir""""' 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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